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In this paper we review evidence about the development of the Chinese capital 
markets over a crucial period in world market history, and place that 
development in the context of world financial markets at the time. Despite 
fundamental differences between China today and China 100 years ago, it is 
still important to consider the dangers of an imbalance between domestic and 
international investor markets, and the mismatch between domestic and 
foreign expectations about investor protection. The lessons of the last century 
suggest that China today should consider opening Chinese investor access to 
foreign capital markets in order to equilibrate the level of diversification 
between foreign and domestic investors.  In addition, protection of domestic 
corporate investor rights is at least as important as protecting foreign investor 
rights. 
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I. Introduction 
 In the first half of the 20th Century, China was one of the hottest emerging 
markets for global investment.  One estimate of total foreign capital invested in China 
in 1938 put it at  $2.5 billion, third behind India and Argentina as a target of 
developing market investment, and not dramatically less than the $7 billion of foreign 
investment in the United States at the time.   Active foreign investment in China, of 
course, has a much longer history. It began in the mid-Qing era, with direct 
investment by Britain and other European countries, and developed by the late-Qing 
into a quasi-colonial relationship with effective foreign control of China’s largest 
commercial port cities.  
The history of foreign investment in China is a huge topic, however this paper 
focuses more narrowly on the process of securitization of the assets of Chinese firms 
and government debt that began to occur in the late 19th Century, both inside and 
outside of China. Over the period 1870 to 1930, the Chinese financial system 
underwent extraordinary change. Chinese enterprise in major port cities developed 
from family-based, private equity ventures and quasi-public firms, to publicly-held 
corporations which could tap both domestic and foreign savings through both 
international and domestic stock and bond markets.  Chinese government borrowing 
began in the late 19th century as an informal process of financial demands levied upon 
wealthy citizen in times of need.  By 1930, despite having defaulted on and 
restructured significant parts of her debt, China was able to issue bonds for major 
infrastructure projects on the leading exchanges of the world. In addition, an active 
domestic bond market provided funding for the nearly ceaseless internal and external 
military struggles that lasted from the fall of the Qing in 1912 to the revolution that 
created the current government in 1949.     
What makes Chinese finance during this transition era particularly interesting 
is not the speed and progress of development so much as the problems encountered 
along the way.   Despite the eventual success of capital markets in Shanghai and other 
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coastal cities by mid-century, Chinese finance lagged far behind developments in 
Europe and Japan during this transition period.  In this paper, we argue that temporary 
imbalances in capital market development between China and the rest of the world 
before the fall of the Qing created political problems for China’s leaders, and left 
Chinese investors at a competitive disadvantage with respect to foreign capital.  While 
Chinese officials in the late Qing tried to remedy this imbalance through regulatory 
reform, these remedies in most cases, were largely ineffectual. Despite 
experimentation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with domestic joint-stock 
companies, China relied primarily on foreign investment through the end of the Qing 
dynasty. The legacy of this reliance is still visible today. 
Foreign investment over the period 1870 to 1930 financed remarkable growth 
in the Chinese economy, however it came at a price - the most visible of being 
preferential government concessions to foreign investors, and partial foreign control 
over government finances. From the foreign perspective, these concessions were 
simply investor protections.  From the Chinese perspective, however, these terms 
were viewed as an affront to Chinese sovereignty and an impediment to the 
development of a domestic corporate sector. As a consequence, the terms of Chinese 
external investments contributed to a backlash against foreign ownership of Chinese 
capital and foreign encroachment on Chinese sovereignty.  Although a vigorous 
capitalist system grew in cities like Shanghai in the late 1920’s and 1930’s, the seeds 
of resentment towards foreign capital became  a popular catalyst for the Leninist 
revolution in 1949, an event that shifted China away from widespread economic and 
financial relationships with large sectors of the developed world.  Only in the last two 
decades has China returned to the global financial community and in the last decade 
China has begun to rebuild her own domestic capital market. 
In this paper, we argue that China today confronts some of the same problems 
she confronted a century ago with respect to the tension between domestic and foreign 
capital markets.  Chinese investors today have access to a large domestic market, but 
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they are still largely constrained from foreign investment. We show that this 
constraint can have a significant impact on the cost of capital for development, and on 
the risks confronted by savers.  Despite great progress recently in modernization of 
Chinese capital markets, Chinese investors today do not yet enjoy the same kinds of 
investor protections as investors in other countries.  One lesson from Chinese 
financial history is that a lack of investor protection impeded progress towards a 
strong domestic capital market, and superior protections negotiated for foreign 
investors created even more severe political problems for the government. 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we place the 
development of China’s equity markets in the context of the global financial system 
of the day.  In section three we do the same for China’s government bond market.  
Section four focuses specifically on the case of Chinese railroad finance. Section five 
develops a model of segmented foreign investment.  Section six concludes.  
Equity Market Development 
 Rudolph Taüber’s 1911 survey of the world’s stock markets provides a useful 
overview of the world of international investing before the First World War.  He 
describes bourses in more than thirty countries around the world available to the 
German investor.1 Henry Lowenfeld, an English author, in his 1909 book Investment 
an Exact Science lists forty countries with stock markets open to British investors.2 In 
fact, for British investors of this era, many of these markets were available by trading 
on the London Stock Exchange itself – either by purchasing stocks and shares in 
                                                 
 1 These include Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Russia, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, France, Great Britain, 
Ireland, New York, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Brasil, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, 
Columbia, Venezuela, Japan, South Africa, Natal, Egypt and Australia. 
 2 Great Britain, India, Canada, Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, Straits Settlements 
(Singapore), Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, 
Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Serbia, Turkey, Japan (Tokio and 
Yokohama), China (Shanghai and Hong Kong), Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, Egypt, New York, 
Mexico, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. 
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foreign firms listed in London, or by purchasing the securities of British firms with 
concessions to operate overseas. Lowenfeld’s analysis is particularly interesting, 
because it proposes an international diversification strategy based on “The 
Geographical Distribution of Capital.” With numerous graphs showing the 
uncorrelated movement of securities from various countries, he argues that superior 
investment performance is obtained by spreading capital in equal proportion across a 
number of geographical sectors and carefully re-balancing back to these proportions 
on a regular basis.    
 
It is significant to see how entirely all the rest of the Geographically 
Distributed stocks differ in their price movements from the British 
stock.  It is this individuality of movement on the part of each security, 
included in a well-distributed Investment List, which ensures the first 
great essential of successful investment, namely, Capital Stability.3 
 
This geographical diversification strategy was apparently a popular one with British 
and other European investors around the turn of the century.   Europe was the world’s 
major exporter of capital to the world until the end of the World War I, when the 
lending role of the United States and Japan grew in prominence.   Michael Edelstein 
ranked Great Britain, France and Germany as the leading creditor nations in terms of 
capital outflows for most five year periods from 1881 to 1913 with Russia, Norway 
Australia, South Africa and the United States also occasionally being net capital 
exporters in this period.4 Cleora Lewis’ comprehensive study of international capital 
flows suggests that by 1938, the U.S., U.K., Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Italy and 
Japan were the only capital exporting countries.5  Of course, this does not mean that 
investors in all non-exporting nations were necessarily undiversified. In the context of 
                                                 
 3 Lowenfeld, Henry, 1909, Investment an Exact Science, The Financial Review of Reviews, 
London. p. 49. 
 4 Edelstein, Michael, 1982, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism, Methuen and 
Co. New York, p. 271. 
5 Lewis, Op. Cit.  
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an equilibrium model like the CAPM, in which all investors hold the same portfolio 
of risky assets, investors from small countries will hold mostly foreign assets, and by 
the same token, the enterprises of small countries will have mostly foreign investors. 
In contrast to Europe, the United States and Japan, China’s capital market 
development in the late 19th century was modest.  The domestic investor opportunity 
set was relatively small, geographically limited, and suffered from early turbulence 
that might have dissuaded more widespread investment. Never-the-less, the path of 
the development of the equity and debt markets in China suggests some reasons for 
the discrepancy, and also makes clear that proposals and potential for development 
existed relatively early. 
The original impetus for tapping Chinese investor capital for development 
came in part from a Chinese scholar who studied overseas.  Yung Wing(容闳), 
famous reformer and a graduate of Yale College in 1854, proposed the joint-stock 
financing of a Chinese steamship transportation company to the governor of Kiansu 
province in 1867.  His plan was approved, but it was not until 1872 that Shanghai 
entrepreneur Sheng Hsun-Huai (盛宣怀) founded the China Merchant’s Steamship 
Navigation Company as a joint-stock company to compete with foreign operated 
maritime transportation lines.6  The company was essentially quasi-private.  Local 
merchants were induced by the provincial government to own shares and to manage 
the firm, and the government provided a loan that was eventually forgiven. The 
company was operated with the joint goal of generating profits for shareholders and 
providing a domestic rival to foreign-owned shipping firms.  
Other Chinese joint-stock companies were formed 1870’s by Sheng and other 
entrepreneurs in the 1870’s and 80’s under the auspices of the Kuan-tu Shang-pan 
(官督商办) system – “Official Supervision and Merchant Management.” The shares 
of these ventures, including the Imperial Telegraph Administration, the Hua-sheng 
Textile Mill in Shanghai and the Imperial Bank of China, were sold primarily to 
wealthy merchants and were subject to virtually no official securities laws. Shares in 
                                                 
6  Feuerwerker, Albert, 1958, China’s Early Industrialization, Harvard University Press.  P. 
97. 
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Kuan-tu Shang-pan ventures were occasionally traded, and prices for most of the 
1880’s were printed in Chinese language newspapers in Shanghai, however there was 
not official exchange for Chinese securities during this stage. 
 China’s first domestic stock price boom dates to the 1880’s when the list of 
publicly traded firms nearly tripled from 10 to 29, and stock prices nearly doubled by 
1882, feeding investor speculative demand.7 Unfortunately, the Shanghai market 
crashed in mid-1880’s, reducing the traded list to 12 and dropping share prices to 
roughly half book value.  This early bubble may have had a long term influence on 
investor appetite for shares. Meanwhile, Figure 1 shows that the stock prices of 
foreign invested companies stayed largely stable, indicating that domestic and foreign 
equity markets are quite separated at that time in China. Following the crash, prices 
were no longer recorded in local newspapers -- the crash of the 1880’s seems to have 
dampened investor enthusiasm for shares for nearly two decades.    
China’s first stock exchange, the Shanghai Share Broker’s Association, was 
founded in 1891 in Shanghai by foreign businessmen. Foreigners founded another 
stock exchange, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, in 1904, which later merged into 
Shanghai Share Broker Association. These exchanges initially only traded shares of 
foreign companies and foreign investment projects. While they facilitated 
international portfolio diversification, it is not clear the extent to which these 
foreigner-founded exchanges served the needs and interests of Chinese investors. 
Only members could trade in the Shanghai Share Broker Association (SSBA) and out 
of the 100 members of SSBA, about 10 members were Chinese.  Do these proportions 
reflect anything about the client-base of the brokers?  We do not know.  Like other 
well-known restrictions by the foreign merchants on Chinese access to institutions, 
until 1935, Chinese were constrained from trading through SSBA.8  Trading in 
domestic shares thus took place apart from the leading exchanges and in all likelihood 
remained relatively small around the turn of the century. The number of domestic 
listings reaching a maximum of 37 in the late Qing era, and investors were 
                                                 
7 Zhu, 1998 
8 Shanghai Archive 1992 P399 
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geographically limited to the vicinity of Shanghai and transactions were infrequent.  
By 1935, the Shanghai China Merchants Stock Exchange had grown to 
become one of the biggest exchanges in the Far East with a list of 190 companies and 
an annual trading volume from 2 to 5 trillion Yuan.  Interestingly, the Shanghai China 
Merchants Stock Exchange itself was a public company listed on the Exchange.  
Shanghai was then one of the most important capital markets in Asia, with a strong 
domestic and international banking sector and a vigorous market for domestic and 
foreign stocks and bonds.  This had not been the case three decade earlier, when 
thoughtful attempts to develop home-grown Chinese capitalism experienced sporadic 
successes and failures that limited the ability of domestic investors to hold diversified 
portfolios.  The early lack of functional capital markets likewise limited the ability of 
Chinese commercial enterprises to access significant capital.  While foreigner-
controlled exchanges functioned relatively earlier than Chinese-controlled exchanges, 
even they could not be compared to the scale and scope of European markets, or to 
contemporaneous capital markets in Japan.   Beyond capital constraints on enterprise, 
the lagging development affected domestic Chinese investors by leaving them 
relatively undiversified when compared to foreign investors who accessed more fully-
developed markets. 
 
Development and Reform 
 
It has been pointed out that embryonic capitalism existed in China from the Late Ming 
onwards, particularly in the mining and manufacturing industries, however, there is 
little question that the encounter with the West, particularly in the major trading ports 
was a major stimulus to domestic enterprise.9 For all of its negative effects on China, 
British gunboat diplomacy in the 19th Century generated considerable opportunity for 
domestic manufacturing development. The success of European business practices 
                                                 
 9 See, for example, Xu, Dixin 许涤新 and Wu Chengming 吴承明, 2000, Chinese Capitalism, 
1522-1840, St. Martins Press, New York.,  
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and financial institutions in trading ports like Shanghai and Hong Kong elicited a 
movement in China to develop her own financial system based upon securitization of 
financial claims. 
   In 1904, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce promulgated a number of 
reforms of the commercial code to facilitate the development of domestic 
corporations and to limit the ability of foreign shareholders and bondholders to gain 
control.  It further established a bankruptcy code in 1905. According to one estimate, 
these efforts attracted130 million taels (or roughly $100 million U.S. dollars) in 
Chinese capital to 265 new domestic corporations between 1903 and 1908.10  Ten of 
these new firms were railway companies representing about half of the capitalization 
of all Chinese corporations registered under the company act of 1904.  Besides 
companies organized under the official code, there were a number of other businesses 
devised to finance railroad development and to compete directly with foreign 
concessionaires.  Figure 1 in the paper, taken from Lee (1977) lists 19 rail companies 
formed from 1903 to 1909, many of which received official provincial subsidies in the 
form of revenues from surtaxes on rice, opium, opium pipes, tea salt, lottery tickets, 
lumber, stamps, rent, official’s salaries, and land.   As the chart suggests, the promised 
rates of return on these investments was not high – ranging from 4% to 7% – although 
it is not clear whether this included the potential for capital gains, since the type of 
security – equity or debt – is not identified.  What is clear is that the targets for capital 
were not met. Even with official subsidies for many of the firms, the actual amount 
raised rarely reached half of the goal.  Was this due to lack of personal capital? 
Unlikely. Macroeconomic estimates of domestic wealth from China in the 1930's, as 
well as accounts of major personal fortunes of her citizens, both suggest that China 
had considerable capacity to finance defense and infrastructure domestically.  One 
problem was surely the lack of experience with the process of share issuance and 
                                                 
 10Lee, En-Han 李恩涵, 1977, China’s Quest for Railway Autonomy: 1904-1911, Singapore 
University Press, Singapore, 1977. P. 268.  These  figures differ slightly from those in Feuerweker 
(1958) Table 1, presumbably due to the addition of  railway companies studied more completely by 
Lee. 
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bond underwriting that European markets had already mastered. 11   
Another problem was corporate governance. Despite legal reforms and active 
efforts to charter domestic enterprises, evidence suggests that most of the new 
businesses after the 1904 reforms did not have the governance structures and 
managerial expertise and independence from governmental control to allow them to 
compete effectively against foreign concerns. Lee’s study of the Chinese chartered 
railroad companies in this era attributes their failure to (1) undercapitalization due to 
higher alternative uses of capital, (2) lack of engineering and technical skill, (3) lack 
of managerial expertise, (4) corruption and embezzlement.12  Of course, the first 
problem of undercapitalization is a symptom and not a cause. Chinese reluctance to 
invest may have been due to competition with internationally diversified investors or 
to rational investor expectations about governance problems or both.  In connection 
with this hypothesis, we will detail a particularly important company in our later 
discussion about railway finance.  
 
 Government Bonds 
   China’s provinces, with the blessings of the Imperial Government, 
first borrowed from foreign merchants during the Taiping rebellion in 1861, and then 
again in 1862 to control bandits in Fukien annd Taiwan. Reliance upon foreign 
merchants continued in 1867 and 1868 with loans to finance the war against Islamic 
rebels in Western China.  Each of these provincial loans was secured on provincial 
shares of Maritime Customs.  The Maritime Customs duties, one of the largest 
sources of government revenue, were collected directly by foreign government 
officials at Chinese ports.13 In Table I we enumerate the Chinese external loans listed 
                                                 
 11 For macroeconomic estimates of savings capacity, see Riskin, Carl (1975).   For a 
discussion of personal fortunes see Huenemann (1982) p. 126. 
 12Lee, Ibid. p. 132-141. 
 13 C.f. Stanley, page 82.  The foreign oversight of Chinese maritime customs revenues began 
as a method for the British and French to collect their war indemnity of 8 million silver taels from 
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in Kuhlmann (1983), and Stanley (1970) and code each according to the security 
pledged for the loan.14  The external loans over the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
essentially securitized an amazing array of specific government revenues, including 
China’s maritime customs, salt taxes, internal provincial transfer taxes [likin], mining 
taxes, alcohol and tobacco taxes, opium revenues, property transfer taxes and 
revenues for railways. Of course, verification and collection of these revenues was an 
important feature of the loan contract.   
The next government loan recorded was floated to defend against the Japanese 
designs on Taiwan in 1874, was likewise secured on the Maritime Customs.  
Maritime Customs again backed the 7% 1.5 million sterling bonds sold in London to 
finance China’s defense against France in the 1880's.   All of the debt incurred in the 
1894-5 war with Japan and the resulting indemnity was secured by Customs revenues, 
as were the Boxer Indemnities – the debt settled on China by the consortium of 
powers after the Boxer Rebellion.  The Boxer Indemnity of £67.5 million was divided 
among 14 powers with roughly 75% going to Russia, Germany, France and Great 
Britain. It effectively absorbed the previously remaining unpledged portion of China’s 
customs revenues and placed her import taxes entirely under foreign control.   
 With her customs revenues largely pledged after 1900, China had to promise 
alternative sources of revenue as collateral on major loans.  Some of the last 
obligations of the Chinese Imperial Government such as the 1910 Kiagnan loan issued 
in France and Belgium were secured by salt taxes. The Qing dynasty fell in 1911 and 
recognition of the Chinese Republic by the great powers was conditional upon 
honoring the debts of the previous government.  Thus, the first major loan of the new 
Republic in 1912 (the 5% Crisp Gold Loan), floated in London, negotiated and 
                                                                                                                                            
China.  40% of custom revenues were paid directly to Britain and France in equal share  from 
collections in all open ports, until the completion of the obligation in 1866.  From that point on, the 
40% share was paid directly to the Imperial Government in Peking, who found it convenient to 
maintain the same structure and oversight of the customs duties. 
 14Stanley, John C. Late Ch’ing Finance: Hu Kuang-Yung as an Innovator, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1970. 
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approved by the new political leaders Sun Yat-sen 孙逸仙 and Yuan Shi-kai 袁世凯,  
was backed  explicitly by salt revenues.   Loans secured by salt taxes followed in 
1911, 1917, 1918, 1922 and 1937 under a variety of Chinese governments. Internal 
transit taxes, called likin(厘金), existed after the Tai-Ping Rebellion.  These were 
pledged as security on Chinese external loans in 1898, 1909, 1911 and in 1912. Why 
are all of these revenues and taxes important?  Because they represented security to 
foreign investors.  China faced constant external and internal military challenges 
through the period of our study and by the end of the 19th Century, the weakness of 
the Imperial Government was well known.  Thus, without such backing, Imperial 
promises to repay were not worth much, even if repayment were deemed to be 
“expedient.” 
 Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Chinese bonds over the period is the 
stability of their yields until 1918. Figure 2 shows the time-series of yields on 
Chinese, Indian, Japanese and Russian bonds over the period. This was a time of 
political tumult for China; a period that included two external wars, the Boxer 
Rebellion, indemnity payments, a revolution that toppled the Qing Dynasty and 
participation in a World War.  Despite these events, the yields on Chinese bonds 
never move outside of a narrow trading band between 5 ½ and 6% from 1899 to 1913, 
and from 6% to 7% from 1913 to 1918. The time-series data this chart is from Global 
Financial Database. It uses a series of yields on Chinese Government bonds quoted on 
the London market and documented in the Investors Monthly Manual published 
monthly by The Economist.  The bonds used are the 8% Taiwan War Loan of 1874, 
The 6% Sterling Loan issued in London by Baring Brothers in 1885, and the 5% 
Reorganization Loan of 1912/13 issued in London, Paris, Frankfort and St. 
Petersburg. The first two bonds were backed by Maritime Customs Receipts. The 
third bond was a direct obligation of the Chinese Government and backed by a Salt 
tax and surplus Maritime Customs.  
This stability of the yields is particularly striking in light of evidence that 
European and American securities reacted strongly to wartime events.  European bond 
markets reflected the wartime fortunes of combatants during WWI, and European 
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equity markets reflected the relative advantages of combatants during WWII15. 
Studies of the United States during its Civil War indicate that the financial markets 
reacted to, and in some cases anticipated outcomes of major battles.16  The rationale 
for market reactions to news from major political events is based on the presumption 
that the likelihood of payment on the security fluctuates with the political and military 
events affecting the issuing authority. Conversely if the foreign shareholder protection 
was ironclad, we would expect to see no price reaction to political events. 
 In China, the first political event we examine for a bond price reaction is the 
1894-95 war with Japan and treaty negotiations on indemnity payments. Speculation 
about the treaty and proposed indemnity payments might have been seen in prices in 
early 1895, and the terms of the treaty, with its 200,000,000 Tael indemnity would 
have become public after April 17, 1895.17 Surprisingly, if anything, the 8% treasury 
bond prices decreased during the war years, despite the fact that the loans to defease 
the indemnity, issued in 1895 at 6%, were also largely secured on the Maritime 
Customs Revenues. 
 The second date we look for yields to reflect an increasing risk of Chinese 
default is the funding of the Boxer Indemnities in 1901, which was not issued as 
bonds, but which captured most if not all of the remaining Customs Revenues until 
the end of the first World War, at which time some of the indemnity was postponed or 
cancelled by various nations.  The Boxer Indemnities had a junior claim on the 
                                                 
 15 For yield fluctuations in Europe during World Wars, see Fergusen, Niall, 2000, The Cash 
Nexus, Basic Books, New York.  For equity fluctuations during World War II see Jorion and 
Goetzmann, 1999, “Global Stock Markets of the 20th Century,” Journal of Finance 54(3) 953-980.   
 16 See Roll, Richard, 1972. "Interest Rates and Price Expectations during the Civil War," 
Journal of Economic History :476-498 and  Kristen L. Willard, Timothy W. Guinnane, Harvey S. 
Rosen, “ Turning Points in the Civil War: Views from the Greenback Market,” NBER Working Paper 
No. W5381, October 1996 
 17 For details of the treaty negotiations see Beasley, W.G., Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, 
Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 64. 
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Maritime Revenues, with priority following previous charges.18  However, despite 
their lower priority, they must have represented a severe economic stress to the 
government, and they were owed directly to nation-states with armies as opposed to 
bond-holders who would have to seek legal protection in the event of default.  Thus, 
the issue of strict claims priority in the event of financial distress must be questioned.  
Despite their importance, there were no price reactions in the London market. 
 The third and perhaps most important event with the potential to affect the 
probability of default on Chinese sovereign debt was the Chinese Revolution of 
October, 1911.   It is only reasonable to assume that an investor holding a promise by 
the Chinese Imperial Government would be concerned by the news that the 
government had been violently overthrown and replaced with a military strongman 
with an unclear popular mandate to rule.  Again, no movement in the bond prices in 
London hint at elevated uncertainty about whether the new government would honor 
its external obligations – despite an obvious, immediate need to consolidate internal 
popular support.  
 Recognition of the new government by world powers was conditional upon 
honoring international debts, and the first step towards this was the 1913 
Reorganization Loan, a £ 25 million loan negated by China’s new ruler Yuan Shi-kai 
袁世凯 with Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Belgium and Japan.  The U.S. 
did not participate, on the objection that the loan interfered in Chinese sovereignty. 
The terms effectively prevented China from using the loan proceeds to defend herself 
against Russian and Japanese designs on Manchuria.19 Indeed, political power was 
directly tied to financial power in the Reorganization Loan negotiations and American 
influence in the course of the complex negotiations over the Reorganization Loan was 
hampered by the lack of a liquid market in the U.S. for foreign government securities. 
Not until the end of WWI did the U.S. assume prominence as a world capital market, 
                                                 
 18Kulhmann, p.34. 
 19Scholes, Walter V. and Marie V. Scholes, the Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration, 
Missouri Press, 1970, p. 237 and ff.  
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in effect, stepping into the vacuum created by financial wartime crises in Great 
Britain.20 By the time the Reorganization Loan was finally negotiated and proceeds 
issued in 1913, the Chinese government was in dire financial straits and needed the 
cash to meet imperial and provincial loans coming due, back pay for the army and 
administrative expenses of the new government.   Certainly some of the loan proceeds 
went to pay the Army in Beijing loyal to Yuan Shih-kai 袁世凯, but contemporary 
observers suspected much of it ended up in the pockets of high officials.21 
 The Reorganization Loan marks the beginning of the finances of the new 
Republic, and a period of higher rates and higher volatility for Chinese bonds. Loan 
rates averaged over 6% in the period up to 1919, which by historical accounts markets 
the beginning of “High Warlordism” by which time the Republic had fractured into a 
number of battling regional powers with shifting alliances and uncertain finances.  It 
is really the first evidence in the time-series of yields on Chinese bonds suggesting 
that political events in China had any bearing at all on the likelihood of bondholder 
repayment. Until that time, apparently the bondholders in London and elsewhere in 
Europe felt confidence that regardless of China’s internal turmoil, the mechanisms 
were in place to insure against governmental expropriation.  
 On October 19, 1921, the Chinese government declared bankruptcy, and with 
few exceptions, China began to default on her foreign loans in the 1920's.  Only bonds 
backed directly by the Maritime Customs Revenues, including the 1898 Anglo-
German Loan and the 1913 Reorganization loan continued to pay.  It is interesting to 
note that Table I indicates clear trends in the sourcing of Chinese debt.  After World 
War I, Japan became a more important lender to China, apparently taking up the slack 
in the ability of European and Russian capital markets.  
                                                 
 20Atkin, John Michael, British Overseas Investment, Arno Press, 1977, p.23 and ff. 
 21 Kulhmann, p. 87. 
 16
 By 1939, virtually all Chinese external loans had defaulted.22 The erosion of 
China’s ability to pay her debts is generally attributed to the breakdown of the 
mechanism for directing revenues to claimants – provincial seizure of revenues during 
her civil war were apparently common as regional warlords needed to finance military 
operations. Finally, the world-wide depression, the devaluation of silver and natural 
disasters finished off China’s ability to borrow externally. 
Although the Imperial government relied almost exclusively on foreign debt, 
the Republic government started to issue domestic debt immediately after the 
revolution. We report the domestic pubic debt issuance in Table 2. In 1914, the 
Republic government established a new agency, Internal Debts Bureau, to overlook 
the issuance of domestic public debts. Most of the high ranking officers of this bureau 
were foreigners, who designed the scheme for domestic issues for the Chinese 
government. The biggest problem with Chinese domestic bonds during that time is 
that they were seldom sufficiently secured – foreign bondholders held debt senior to 
domestic bondholders. Many domestic debts were secured with the remainder of 
customs revenues, which were controlled by foreigners and largely pledged to 
previous foreign debts. Lack of revenue brought the government to the verge of 
bankruptcy. In the1920s, the Republic government defaulted on domestic as well as 
foreign loans and had to reorganize its debts.  
 After the Nanjing Government took control of most of the country in the 
1920’s, it further increased the size of domestic public debt issuance, resulting in 
another default in 1929. The paper annual yield of most previous public debts was 
reduced from 7-8 percent down to 6 percent and the re-organization plan also 
extended the maturity of the debts to twice as long as originally designed. Shortly 
after the reorganization, the government picked up the speed of public debt issuance 
again. The ever-increasing size of public debts put the government into default again 
in 1935. The government issued 2,082,000,000 Yuan worth of public debts in 1936 to 
reorganize its debts, which is the largest issuance in a single year till then.  
                                                 
 22 Kuhlmann, p. 5. 
 17
 After the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the government issued various 
domestic bonds during the eight years of the war. The government no longer targeted 
individual investors in its debt issuance during that period. Instead, it turned towards 
banks. Paradoxically, with the weakening of the central government, The banks in 
Shanghai – China’s money center – became relatively strong.   While the government 
defaulted frequently, Chinese banks in this era had a sterling reputation.23  To attract 
investment from Chinese living overseas, some debts was issued in foreign currencies 
outside China. In addition to regular debts, the government also issued debt 
denominated in commodities such as wheat and rice. Because the regular taxes and 
custom revenues decreased dramatically during the Sino-Japanese War, the public 
debts issued during that period were at even greater risk of default.  Eventually, 
inflation solved the government’s problems at the expense of domestic bondholders. 
The inflation of the 1940’s decreased the real value of investments by 90%. Finally, 
the ‘Currency Reform’ of 1948 issued a new currency at a rate of 3,000,000 to 1 to 
original currencies, wiping out most existing domestic debt.  
 In sum, Chinese government obligations over roughly sixty years around the 
turn of the 19th Century can be divided into a period of financial stability followed by 
a period of volatility.  Paradoxically the period of stability in her loan payments was 
also a volatile period politically.  China met obligations despite the sizable Japanese 
Indemnities and Boxer Indemnities for more than a decade.  This was not entirely due 
to choice – the stability in Chinese bond prices in the first decade of the 20th century is 
almost certainly attributable to the foreign control of Chinese government revenues. It 
may be argued that the foreign control of revenues was good for foreign bondholders 
– at least in the short term – but perhaps bad for the new Chinese Republic, which 
suffered from a lack of military funding, despite the first Reorganization loan.  It is 
particularly interesting that   the very transparency and accountability of the Maritime 
Customs Revenues that guaranteed bondholder security also restricted the ability of 
                                                 
23  See, for example, Fortune Magazine’s June 1932 feature, “Celestial Modernism in the Banks of 
China”. 
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the central state to access cash when needed.  Her cost of capital was low, but it may 
not have been such a bargain. 
 The comparison to the loan fluctuations in other Asian countries is instructive.   
Figure 2 and 3 indicates that China was unusual in the period before 1912 in the 
stability of her bond yields. For example, Russian debt yields fluctuated dramatically, 
with lows in 1890's and highs following their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. 
Japanese debt yields began higher than China’s but dropped dramatically after her 
settlement with China in the 1890's. They rose again before the Russo-Japanese War 
and then dropped with its successful conclusion. Even India – a full-fledged colony of 
Britain – had more volatile bond yields than China in this period. The conclusion we 
draw from these comparative dynamics is that the distinctive characteristics of the 
Chinese loans – in particular their enhanced security features – may have played a 
role in insulating investors from risk. In the next section, we focus on one of the most 
important types of Chinese loans during the period – railway loans -- and examine 
their role in Chinese political change. 
 
Railway Loans 
Like his contemporary Yung Wing, Ma Jianzhong was another Chinese 
scholar responsible for proposing the use of the securities markets to finance railway 
development in China.  Like Wing, his proposals were eventually adopted by the 
Chinese government. Ma obtained a baccalaurat in 1879 from Ecole Libre des 
Sciences Politiques in Paris. In that year, after a careful study of European economies, 
he wrote a compelling analysis of China’s need to use bonds to finance railway 
development in the same manner as European nations. Noting that, despite their 
relative small geographical size,   
 
It seems that these countries can draw on a source as vast and copious 
as a wellspring or river.  By what means do they bring about such a situation? 
They ensure firstly that they gain the people’s trust, secondly that they have a 
clear method of borrowing, and thirdly that they repay the loans within a fixed 
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time period. 24 
  
Much has been written about global railway finance around the turn of the century.  
By most accounts the competition among the great powers to secure railway 
concessions during this period through a combination of political diplomacy and the 
financial might of their capital markets is, in some ways, the high point of the age of 
Imperialism. At least it was characterized as such by contemporary commentators 
such as Lenin, who used the division of China into spheres of influence by foreign 
capitalists as the example of Capitalist Imperialism par excellence.25   
 Although being under the nominal control of the Chinese Railway 
Commission, virtually all of China’s   railways constructed after 1895 were financed 
by foreign debt issues underwritten by European-led investment banking syndicates 
which obtained right of way, property concessions and promises of repayment from 
the Chinese Imperial government. Under the control of the bankers who financed the 
loans, Chinese railways were constructed, owned and operated by managers 
designated by the financial consortium. Certainly the most contentious feature of 
these loans was their provision for extra-territorial rights, which is essence “means the 
substitution of the court procedure of a creditor country for the business practices of 
the debtor country.”26     
 The Chinese Eastern Railway was a prime example of extra-territoriality. The 
Russo-Chinese bank issued a 5 million tael loan in Russia in 1896 to finance the 
construction of a railway across Manchuria linking the Trans-Siberian Railway to 
Vladivostok. The railway and its right of way were entirely administered and policed 
by Russian officials, who controlled the receipts and disbursements.  The line was, in 
                                                 
24   Ma, Jianzhong,  1879, “On the Use of Loans to Build Railroads,”  in Paul Bailey, ed. 
Strengthen the Country and Enrich the People: the Reform Writings of Ma Jiazhong , Curzon Press, 
Surry, 1998. 
 25Lenin, Vladimir Illyich, 1916, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism. 
 26 Adams, Henry C. 1920, “International Supervision Over Foreign Investments,” The 
American Economic Review, 10(1) 58-67. 
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effect, a little bit of Russian territory within China’s borders, and issued its own 
currency.27 Japan followed the same model with the loan for the 1917 South 
Manchurian Railway, which was secured upon the railway’s properties. The railway 
became Japan’s first territorial stake in China. A Belgian loan issue of 1897 financed 
the construction of the  Lung-Tsing-U-Hai Railway  and was secured by the railway 
itself and the property and rights of way owned by the company. 
 Foreign financed, owned, operated and policed railways represented an 
obvious threat to Chinese sovereignty, an issue widely debated by contemporary 
observers. For example, economist A.P. Winston, writing in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics in 1916, is sharply critical of the foreign companies “monopolizing” the 
financing, construction and control of Chinese railways.28 In contrast to Britain, 
France, Russia, Belgium and Japan, the United States – for the most part -- pursued an 
“Open-Door” policy with respect to China, based on the principle of equal access by 
all nations to Chinese markets and resources, and the preservation of Chinese national 
sovereignty as opposed to its fragmentation and colonization by world powers.29 As a 
consequence, America generally opposed contracts that suggested preferential access 
to rail concessions. One exception to this policy, and perhaps the most important and 
spectacular example of Chinese railways concessions, is the Hukuang Loan. 
 The Hukuang loan is important in Chinese history for many reasons. The story 
of the loan illustrates the struggle between provincial and national powers in the late 
Qing period. It also illustrates how Chinese capitalists sought to fund development 
internally.  Finally, it reveals the political consequences of foreign concessions – the 
Hukuang loan has been interpreted by some historians as the spark that led to the 
1911 revolution and the end of 3,000 years of dynastic rule. 
                                                 
 27Dreyer, Edward L., 1995, China at War 1901-1949, Addison,Wesley, Longman,Essex p. 29. 
 28 Winston, A.P., 1916, “Chinese Finance Under the Republic,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 30(4) August, p. 738-779. 
 29 Scholes, alter V. and Marie V. Scholes, 1970, The Foreign Policies of the Taft 
Administration contains a detailed description of the U.S.  China policy. 
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 Hukuang is a region in south-central China which includes the provinces of  
Hunan, Hubei,  and part of Szechuan.  In 1905, a consortium of Hukuang gentry, 
officials and businessmen, with the blessing and participation of the provincial 
governor Chang Chih-Tung, obtained a concession to develop a domestically financed 
rail line through Hukuang. It came after the successful provincial lobbying for 
compensated cancellation of the development rights of J.P. Morgan’s American China 
Development Companywhich actually fronted for a Belgian rail development firm 
seeking to construct a line from Canton to Hankow. The line was a key route through 
Hukuang linking a commercial port to the cross-roads of Chinese rail lines in the 
interior, and the cancellation of the foreign concession opened the door for domestic 
development.  
 After the cancellation of the American concession, the Hukuang gentry took 
an active role in gaining concessions. For example, the Canton-Hankow line was 
divided between two domestic concessionaires, one in Kwangtung (Guangdong) and 
the other in Hunan. The experience of the Kwangtung company illustrates some of the 
problems of corporate governance experienced in the emerging Chinese legal 
framework. The firm was among the most successful of Chinese companies at capital 
subscription. All 44 million Taels was raised, much of it from wealthy overseas 
Chinese investors. Overseas Chinese participation in the venture is particularly 
interesting given the issues of diversification discussed earlier.  An initial price of one 
Tael per share attracted widespread popular domestic interest. An account in the 
North China Herald is particularly graphic in its description of investor enthusiasm 
for buying railway shares. 
 
Not only are the monied classes rushing to buy shares, but the poorest 
of the poor and even those who are supposed of no cash to spare and 
hardly enough to keep body and soul together are buying up one or 
more shares.30 
                                                 
 30  Quoted in  Lee, En-han 李恩涵, 1977, “China’s Quest for Railway Autonomy: 1904- 1911: 
A study of the Chinese Railway Rights Recovery Movement,” Singapore University Press.  P. 104.   
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 Many of the shares were sold to the public through provincial charitable 
institutions, which failed to register them in the name of the subscribers and instead 
retained the voting rights for themselves.  With the help of these same organizations, 
and over the violent protests of shareholders, the president of the Canton Chamber of 
Commerce took control of the company and precipitated further proxy contests and 
ultimate intervention by provincial authorities. An audit of the company books in 
1909 revealed massive embezzlement. The management had falsified the books by 
inflating expenses, and had been purchasing equipment at high prices through 
suspicious transactions.31 
 The movement after the turn of the century towards domestic financing is 
often interpreted as a grassroots nationalistic response to the threat of external 
financing and control of Chinese infrastructure by foreign concerns, however this 
characterization may be too simplistic. The gentry in China at this time was a class of 
educated social elite who served a political role as local intermediaries between the 
imperial government and the populace, and who exerted considerable local control 
and influence over commercial affairs.  Early in the history of Chinese railway 
development, Er-Tu Zen Sun observes: 
 
Chinese railways often suffered from forces in the environment that 
tended to obstruct their normal operations.  These obstructions cane 
from different quarters.  It was sometimes the local gentry in the early 
years of railway history: over 3,000 taels were paid in 1906 to a 
number of local influential personages along the route of the P’ing 
hsiang-Hsiangt’an line , for example, as salary for “protecting the 
road,” in permission to lay the track through their districts.32 
                                                 
 31 Account taken from Lee, 1977, p. 140. 
 32Sun, E-Tu Zen, 1955, “The Pattern of Railway Development in China,” The Far Eastern 
Quarterly 14(2) February, 179-199. 
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 In his study of the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910, Rosenbaum finds that the gentry 
played a key role in using xenophobic sentiment about foreign railroad development 
to turn the populace against the Manchu government. Indeed, Chang Chih-t’ung 
张之洞 had turned down a proposal by a local merchant guild to fund a proposed rail 
line in Hunan in favor of a gentry-dominated, quasi-governmental firm. According to 
Rosenbaum it suffered a similar fate to the Kwangdong company. 
The operations in 1907-1908 were an unmitigated disaster. Virtually 
no power was assigned to shareholders, a number of whom apparently 
were merchants.  In late 1907 large numbers of private shares were 
withdrawn. Those excluded from a voice in management continued to 
protest, although it is not clear whether their main target was the 
incompetent gentry management or the government’s refusal to 
reorganize the company into a purely private venture.33 
 
  In sum, the experience of the domestic rail companies that obtained the 
concessions in place of the American China Development Company was unfortunate.  
The formation of domestic companies for rail development had the potential as a 
catalyst for personal investing in domestic ventures.  The active participation of 
overseas Chinese in these ventures suggests that the domestic firms might even have 
had the potential for attracting international capital of a sort. All the more unfortunate 
that, despite the laudable goals of self-financed railway development, and the 
willingness of Chinese great and small to invest their savings in such ventures, the 
fundamental structure of corporate governance was not yet in place in China.  Sadly, 
it appears that combination of poor corporate governance, and an entrenched gentry 
that operated under a system of prestige and influence made it difficult to compete 
with foreign companies incorporated abroad under governance systems well 
understood by well-diversified investors. 
 Ultimately, despite nationalistic sentiments and powerful local interest groups, 
Chang brokered sole British financing for the railway – a move that threatened to tip 
                                                 
 33 Rosenbaum, Arthur L., 1975, “Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910,” Journal 
of Asian Studies 34(3) May, p. 689-715.  
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the delicate balance of foreign influence in the Yangtze region.34  To combat British 
advantage, Germany, France and finally the U.S. demanded participation in the loan, 
the construction,  and the control.  The final result was a £6,000,000 sterling loan 
shared by the four powers, with the rights to develop separate sections of track 
carefully negotiated among the participants.  In a move that doubtless infuriated the 
gentry, Chang then closed the deal by persuading the Qing government to nationalize 
all domestic railway development on the grounds that delays caused by the 
undercapitalization of domestic developers were impeding progress. The 
expropriation of domestic shareholder rights was thus complete.  
 The 5%, 50 year Hukuang Railways Sinking Fund Gold Loan was signed in 
1911 with the Imperial chop of the Minster of Posts and Communications.  The bond 
also bears the details of the security for the loan.  Besides the net revenues of the 
railroad, the loan pledged as security (1) the Hubei general likin of $2 million 
Taels/year, (2) the Hubei additional salt tax for river defense of 400,000 Taels/year, 
(3) a new, additional salt tax established in 1908 (during the period of loan 
negotiation) of 300 Taels/ year, (4) the Hubei collection of Hukuang inter-provincial 
taxes on imported rice of 250 Taels/year, (5) Hunan general likin revenues of 2 
million Taels/year and (6) the Hunan salt commissioner’s treasury allotment of 
regular salt likin of 250,000 Taels/ year.  Presumably, this collateral was vital to pay 
bondholders during the railroad construction period.    While the people of Hukuang 
were getting a modern railroad, they were paying for it with salt taxes, new salt taxes, 
rice taxes and taxes on inter-provincial transfers which presumably would increase 
with the extension of the rail system.   In addition, the development rights were 
effectively expropriated from local business interests and handed to foreigners by the 
provincial governor acting in concert with the Imperial government. 
 Kuhlmann found a particularly interesting account of the consequences of the 
Hukuang loan. Quoting Chang Kia Ngau, China’s Struggle for Railroad 
Development: 
                                                 
 34Scholes and Scholes p. 127. 
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When the new policy of nationalization was made known the people 
raised a storm of opposition.  Popular indignation was once more 
aroused to an extraordinary extent.  It was especially intense in 
Szechuan, where strikes took place in the markets and schools.  The 
provincial legislature was thrown into turmoil by the arrest of its 
speaker and deputy speaker.  The people of the provincial capital 
Chengdu marched en masse to the official residence of the viceroy, and 
sentries fired into the crowd, killing scores of people.  This enraged the 
people still more, and they refused to pay any more taxes and levies.  
By the middle of July many thousands of persons surrounded and 
attacked the city of Chengdu, being supported by the neighboring 
townships and villages.  The coincidence of the outbreak of the 
revolution in Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the Yangtse River [In 
Hubei Province] – greatly heartened the people of Szechuan.  To 
suppress the movement, the Imperial Government sent its well-
equipped soldiers under the command of General Tun-Fang (端方)to 
Szechuan, but the general was assassinated on his way, and the 
Viceroy of Szechuan met with the same fate. On September 10, 1911, 
the people of Szechuan declared themselves independent of the old 
regime and in sympathy with the revolutionary cause. On October 16, 
Prince Regent Chun proclaimed on behalf of the boy emperor his 
abdication from the throne.35 
 
 While this account conflates a number of riots and unrest in the period just 
before the revolution, a careful study of one of the most important riots over Chinese 
railroad rights during this period – the Changsha rice riots of 1910 – clearly implicates 
the local gentry as fomenters of resistance against the Qing government.36 With the 
Qing government siding with foreign investors in financing Chinese development, 
The rights recovery movement turned against the Manchu rulers as well as foreign 
commercial interests. 
 The Hukuang Railway loan was the last external debt of the Chinese Imperial 
Government, and it defaulted in the 1920's.  China as a nation continued to borrow for 
                                                 
 35 Quoted in Kuhlmann, Willhelm, China’s Foreign Debt, self-published, 1983, p.73. 
 36 Rosembaum, Arthur, 1975, “Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910,” Journal of 
Asian Studies, 34(3) May, 689-715. 
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railway development until late into the 1930's – rail loans appear in 1934, 1935, 1936 
and 1937.  The only significant gaps in railroad bond issuance in the database are 
1926 and 1927 (coinciding with Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石)’s northern military 
campaign to unify China), and the first four years of the Great Depression of the 
1930's.  With these exceptions, Chinese railway financing and development by 
foreign investors continued in the face of civil war and eventually foreign occupation. 
 
Summing Up 
The development of Chinese capital markets from the period 1870 to 1930 had 
advances and set-backs. Given the early vision by Chinese intellectuals regarding the 
potential to develop an internal equity market and to exploit foreign bond markets for  
economic development it is somewhat surprising that China experienced such 
difficulties on both of these fronts. While history tends to focus on the success stories 
in development, Chinese financial history suggests that the difference between 
success and failure sometimes lies in a few, salient events – the equity market crash of 
the 1880’s, failure of  the early domestic rail companies,  the misjudgment  by the 
Imperial government about domestic sentiment about foreign concessions. Ultimately, 
the reasons for the uneven development of Chinese market may have had to due as 
much with historical events as with environmental, legal or cultural factors.  After all, 
China and Japan started out borrowing on the world’s bond markets at about the same 
time and at about the same rate, with the same restrictive covenants.  Japan won a 
series of wars with her Asian neighbors and China lost a series of wars. Whether 
Japans’ well-developed capital markets were a cause of effect of these outcomes is a 
matter of debate. 
 In our analysis below, we explore two themes that we believe had an 
important impact on Chinese capital market development – and potentially on history.   
Among various factors, we find diversification and corporate governance and investor 
protects two distinct features that distinguished Chinese capital markets from those in 
the West. We will emphasize on examining these two features in this section and 
propose corresponding policy recommendation in the next section 
 27
 
Diversification 
One particularly crucial feature of Europe’s capital markets  – in contrast to 
markets that were limited to domestic securities, was the capacity for even small 
investors to hold diversified portfolios. In terms of financial theory, this imbalance in 
diversification meant that foreigners may have effectively been the marginal investors 
in Chinese enterprise and public debt. That is, in head-to-head competition between 
foreign and Chinese capitalists for commercial projects  – simply by virtue of a cost 
of capital driven by relative diversification – the foreigners could pay more. 
 When one set of investors is able to diversify their portfolios through 
international investments and another set is constrained to hold assets in only one 
country, the cost of capital is potentially affected. Consider the following stylized 
example.  There are two separate capital markets, market 1 and market 2 in which 
investors holding shares in market 1 cannot hold shares in market 2 and vice versa.  
Take market 1 to be China and market 2 to be the European capital markets of the 
turn of the century.  Now consider a new project, n, which pays a random cash flow 
and needs financing.  The project owner must decide which market will give the best 
terms. In effect he will choose the market with the lowest cost of capital for the 
project which is the expected rate of return E[Rn1] or E[Rn1].  Let us assume that the 
standard equilibrium asset pricing model CAPM holds in each separate market, that 
the coefficient of risk aversion for the representative investor in each market is equal, 
that each project is atomistic in its respective market, and that the riskless rate of 
return, Rf is the same in each market.  Using standard notation for betas, correlations, 
variances and covariances, and letting θ be the coefficient of risk aversion, the 
conditions determining the relative costs of capital in each market are then 
straightforward 
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 Equation (1) 
For the owner to be indifferent between sources of financing, the covariances 
of the cash flows of project n with respect to the segmented market portfolios must be 
equal.   However, suppose there is an inequality? Equation 1 suggests that the 
required rate of return on the project in market 1 will be larger than in market 2 when 
the covariance of the project with respect to the market index 1 is greater. For China, 
it is natural to assume that domestic development projects had a higher covariance 
with the domestic, market-weighted portfolio of Chinese companies than with the 
market-weighted portfolio of the rest of the world’s companies, excluding China.   
This suggests that the cost of capital in the domestic market – if fully segmented – 
will be higher.   
 This interpretation should be tempered, however, with the understanding that 
the requirements for a pricing model like the CAPM to hold – particularly liquidity 
requirements – are probably unrealistic for China in the last century.   In addition, it is 
not clear whether a railway project in China would have a higher covariance with 
other economic activity in China, or with a world index which is heavily weighted to 
railway companies.  This is an empirical matter for further research.  Finally, 
Shanghai at the turn of the century had banks and equity markets.  Did these allow 
Chinese investors to diversify their portfolios internationally – effectively making our 
assumption of segmentation incorrect?  Again, this is a matter for further research. 
 Equation 1 characterizes conditions in terms of covariances, but this effect can 
be decomposed into correlations and standard deviations, which allows us to consider 
the relative importance of diversification. Under what conditions will we find the cost 
of capital be smaller for market 2 than for market 1? Assuming correlations to be 
positive: 
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Equation 2 suggests that even in the case where the  n1 =  n2, if the standard 
deviation of the world wealth portfolio (excluding China) were lower than the 
standard deviation of the Chinese market index, then the owner would find external 
financing more attractive. As Stulz (1999) points out, and as contemporary 
commentators on international investing noted, the risk of a global investor’s portfolio 
was reduced through geographical diversification. In a world where one group of 
investors is diversified and another group is not, the diversified investors are simply 
willing to pay more for the same asset. This obtains when the added asset is more 
highly correlated to the domestic investor’s portfolio, and also when the volatility of 
the domestic portfolio is higher. If this were true in China 100 years ago, we would 
expect to find reluctance by Chinese investors to invest capital in domestic projects on 
the same terms provided to foreign investors.  Of course, this analysis may simply 
pre-suppose too much about the relative development of Chinese capital markets. 
 As the early historical analysis suggests, the western encounter with China 
during the 19th century was  as much a clash of financial systems as it was a clash of 
technology and culture.  There was no Chinese parallel to the rapid European 
development of government and corporate bond and share markets over the 19th 
Century.  This stands in marked contrast to Japanese efforts in the late 19th century to 
develop internal capital markets.  Like China, Japan first floated foreign bonds in the 
1870's.  However unlike China, virtually all Japanese financing until the mid-1890's 
made active use of an internal government debt market, and much economic 
development was financed by a business environment consciously adopted during the 
Meiji period from successful European models.37   In contrast, the Chinese financial 
system in the mid to late 19th century was dominated by pawnshops and money shops 
                                                 
 37Suzuki, Toshi, 1994, Japanese Government Loan Issues on the London Capital Market 
1870-1913, Athlone Press, London. 
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for small-scale lending,  exchange banks for distant  transfer of funds, and, after 1860,  
customs banks in major ports to receive and disburse customs payments for foreign 
trade.38  The lack of a capital market meant that most lending and equity investment 
was private.  The government did not borrow by issuing public debt, and by some 
accounts, regarded the payment of interest for borrowing anathema.   Despite 
exhortations by reform-minded intellectuals such as Ma Jianzhong, interest-free 
lending to the government was seen as a obligation.  In his history of Late Qing 
finance, Stanley quotes a telling statement from a government official in the 1870's 
regarding the domestic issue of bonds: “As the loan is one from people to officials, it 
is inexpedient that it should bear interest.”39  Such governmental resistance to 
compensation for the time-value of money cuts two ways.  The government deposited 
tax revenues with exchange banks and demanded no interest – presumably the yield 
on these deposits, if realized, were regarded as the benefits of patronage.   
Understandably, the official attitude towards government loans made it hard to 
borrow from her own citizens.   Thus, the effects of diversification may have been 
secondary to the simple lack of a liquid capital market. 
 There is some historical evidence that the required rates of return on foreign-
financed capital projects during this era were less than the rates of return to externally 
financed infrastructure projects. Pommeranz cites evidence that the “prime rate” 
charged to the government and leading merchants by Tianjin banks and pawnshops in  
the late 18th century was 10% to 12%.  Broader surveys of Chinese interest rates in the 
early 20th century document annualized median interest rates on agricultural loans 
30%, and for business ventures, required loan rates of 7% to 8% plus a share in equity 
profits.40   Lee notes that capital opportunities outside of the traditional investment in 
real estate and pawn shops also yielded higher returns – Chinese capitalists were 
                                                 
 38 See Stanley, John C. Late Ch’ing Finance: Hu Kuang-Yung as an Innovator, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1970.  Pages 19-29. 
39 Ibid. p. 65. 
40 Huenemann, p. 128-129. 
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actively investing in export-oriented industries such as textile and food processing. 
Lending to the government and buying railroad bonds and shares were comparatively 
unattractive places for capital.41   Unfortunately, there is no systematic survey of rates 
of return on investments in China at this time, because there was no large-scale public 
capital market.    What is clear is that it was hard to attract domestic investment. The 
Chinese were not major investors in government loans or domestic development 
projects in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries  – a simple economic explanation for 
this is that there were superior risk-adjusted alternative uses of capital.  
 The dramatic export of capital from Europe, and the active practice of 
international portfolio diversification must surely have had a significant effect on the 
markets into which Europe’s capital flowed. Stulz (1999) argues that the modern 
trend towards globalization has reduced the global cost of capital through the 
diversification effect.  Motivated by similar interests, Bakaert and Harvey (1995) and 
Beckaert and Lundblad (2000) carefully examine the shifts in cost of capital and 
market risks in emerging markets as they integrate into the world capital market.  The 
general conclusions reached by these and other researchers studying world capital 
market liberalizations is that the cost of capital drops as outside investors are given 
access to local investment projects. There are obviously positive features of this drop 
in terms of cost of capital – capital projects previously unattractive due to low rates of 
return are can now be financed.   Lower interest rates can be an extraordinary boom to 
the economy. Hou (1965) and Huenemann (1984) both document the dramatic 
expansion of the Chinese economy resulting from foreign investment n the late 19th 
century. However, the other side of the coin is that, in the competition for control of 
domestic assets, the undiversified local investor is at a relative disadvantage.   
 This competition between domestic and international investors is the theme of  
Rajan and Zingales (2001). They point out that, despite the obvious efficiencies of 
international financing, domestic investors may strongly resist competition.  The 
motive for such resistance is, presumably, the additional benefits of influence attached 
                                                 
 41 Lee, op.cit. P. 133. 
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to rights of control enjoyed by local management.  When these rights are challenged 
without compensation, and the powers of local interests are not governed by strict rule 
of law, the consequences are potentially explosive. 
 
 Corporate Governance and Investor Protection 
The second factor in the trajectory of Chinese financial history is the relative 
ineffectiveness of legal protection and governance structures for enterprise in China, 
compared to the extraordinary protections negotiated by foreign investors.  By the late 
19th Century, many European nations had developed laws and norms for the definition 
and governance of business enterprise, as well as legal protection of the rights of 
security holders – both holders of corporate obligations and holders of sovereign debt.   
In Asia, Japan moved quickly to adopt financial markets and structures patterned after 
European models, but major steps in this direction were not taken in China until the 
early 20th Century.   Even then, stake-holders of various kinds – from local gentry to 
provincial government officials wielded considerable power and influence over 
commercial enterprise.  Virtually all the major rail and mining firms operation in 
China before the 20th Century were incorporated in Europe, not China. As noted 
above, these foreign concessionaires extracted guarantees from the Chinese Imperial 
Government such as direct control over collection of revenues, the right of property 
seizure in case of default, the right to source their own materials, and exclusivity 
against domestic or foreign competition.  In some cases, concessions included near-
complete autonomy from Chinese law and taxation, and freedom from local 
competition – even the right in some cases to issue a separate currency. While such 
deals may have lowered the risk to foreign investors, their effect was to elevate the 
protection enjoyed by foreign firms above Chinese firms. 
 The protections for foreign investors in Chinese government bonds were even 
more extraordinary. Beginning in the mid-19th Century the Chinese Maritime 
Customs revenues were collected and controlled by the British. Payments on foreign 
debt could thus be taken directly from customs revenues before going to the treasury – 
effectively giving foreign bond holders senior claim to China’s primary source of   
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revenue.  While this undoubtably lowered the Chinese Government’s cost of capital 
by reducing the probability of default, it also limited the fiscal options of the Chinese 
state, and put her purse-strings in the hands of a foreign power.    
Foreign control of Chinese Maritime Customs, and the commercial 
concessions extended to foreigners may have served at first to control foreign investor 
risks, but they had obvious political repercussions. Indeed, they were regarded then, 
as now, as dangerous, intermediate steps towards the foreign colonialization of 
China.42  Foreign control of China’s transportation system and trade revenues put the 
Imperial government at the mercy of political attempts to press territorial advantage.  
The great powers: Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan all had imperialistic 
designs on Chinese territory.   While investor benefits may have been the original 
motivation for commercial and governmental concessions, following the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895, the great powers vied with each other to finance Chinese rail 
development – regardless of whether there was demand by investors for the loans. 
China was chronically in debt in the early 20th Century as a result of indemnities 
settled on her by these same powers – a condition that gave foreign nations more 
leverage in negotiations to expand their spheres of territorial influence.  The pressure 
of foreign powers on the Chinese government together with the institutional 
imbalances between Chinese financial markets and those of the developed world was 
an explosive combination. They finally led to the foreign ownership of productive 
capital, to foreign capitalists playing in China by their own rules, and to the pretext 
for weakening of the state control over her own territory. In an influential series of 
cross-sectional studies of the world’s capital markets, LaPorta et al. (1997,1999,2000) 
show that protection of investor rights is just as important as getting access to their 
capital – in fact without the rights, capital is remarkably scarce.  They demonstrate 
that the legal environment is one of the most important determinants of the success of 
corporate capitalism in a country. Empirical evidence by these authors and others who 
                                                 
 42 See, for example, Winston, A. P., 1916, “Chinese Finance Under the Republic,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 30(4) August, 738-779. 
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have built upon their work shows that legal origin determines the protection of 
shareholder rights which in turn helps determine the size and functioning of the 
capital market which in turn determines the efficiency of the allocation of capital to 
enterprise.43 What determines the origin of the country’s legal system? Colonialism is 
a major cause. Colonialism, for all of its known faults, can be thought of an export 
mechanism for the legal framework from one country to the other.  LaPorta et al. 
show that even when the government itself is no longer a colonial one, the legal 
framework may continue to provide differential benefits to private enterprise within 
the country.   Pushing this evidence a bit further, one can interpret a colonial world as 
one form of political-economic equilibrium in which investor-friendly legal systems 
across the world allow for increased efficiency in capital allocation and the emergence 
of private enterprise. Of course, there is another side to this coin when the issue of 
national sovereignty supercedes economic motives.  
 
Conclusion 
 Sometimes, finance plays a central role in the political development of nation-
states, both as an agent for the state’s formation and as an agent for the state’s 
destruction. The story of China’s first major encounter with the world’s financial 
markets is inseparable from global politics. The world’s financial markets of a century 
ago were anything but laissez-faire – at least as far as China was concerned.  Loan 
negotiations which began as investor protections ultimately became the means for 
colonial designs on China.  Railways played a key role in the extension of foreign 
control and even foreign legal environments into China.  
 None of this could have occurred, however, without the fundamental drivers 
of finance.  In this paper, we identify two key financial motivations which in some 
sense are stateless. First, we argue that the high level of development, and the demand 
for international diversification by sophisticated investors in the global money centers 
                                                 
 43 Jeffrey Wurgler, 2000, “Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 58(1) 187-214, October. 
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of Britain and Continental Europe gave a relative advantage to foreigners. Chinese 
sovereign debt found a ready market in London, and experienced relative stability in 
yields due to investor protections negotiated with the Chinese government. Investors 
also financed potentially highly profitable infrastructure projects in China – 
particularly railroads. We argue that the existence of a liquid capital market, and the 
power of international diversification, put foreign investors in a relatively better 
position to bid for Chinese projects. The active markets in Europe and Japan were 
able to mobilize the capital of small investors. Modern portfolio theory suggests that 
the diversification enjoyed by these investors through the global markets allowed 
them to accept lower rates of return than China’s domestic investors. 
 The second major factor is investor protection. While the extraterritorial terms 
provided to foreign investors were anathema to the Chinese people, the historical 
evidence suggests that they may have been a necessary condition to allow 
development and operation without the interference of local interest groups.  The 
gentry-led movement to regain railway development rights from foreigners in the 
early 1900's has been viewed as a nationalistic movement to regain Chinese rights.   
The experience of the shareholders in these companies suggests that the potential for a 
genuine capital market in China was hobbled by the inability to protect the minority 
rights of domestic investors. 
 The role of finance in Chinese politics of a century ago is of more than 
historical interest. With the re-emergence of global investing in emerging markets, 
China is poised to attract considerable financial capital. China is in a much stronger 
position today politically and militarily and thus the issues of extra-territoriality and 
sovereignty are less threatening than 100 years ago.  It is worth noting, however, that 
in part due to financial history, China is understandably still sensitive to violations of 
her territorial sovereignty.   
 The key factors of diversification and governance remain relevant. As 
commercial opportunities arise in China today, will her own investors be able to 
compete against foreign investors to finance projects? One way to insure this 
possibility is to offer domestic investors the possibility of investing outside of China, 
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either directly, by liberalizing currency exchange, or internally by listing international 
shares on Chinese exchanges and by launching international mutual funds that are 
accessible to Chinese savers. Although this means that some Chinese capital will be 
exported, it also means that the domestic investor opportunity set will be equal to that 
of foreign savers, and as a consequence, Chinese investors will demand the same rates 
of return as foreigners, and the marginal investors in Chinese ventures will not 
necessarily be foreign. 
 The second factor is China’s experience with corporate governance. The 
enthusiasm for investing immediately following the promulgation of corporate laws in 
1904 was tempered by the failures of corporate governance.  These failures were 
nothing special to China. Governance is a particularly challenging problem for many 
countries in the world right now. One interpretation of the unequal rights and 
concessions associated with foreign finance is that they were a means to control the 
risks associated with emerging market investing. But the experience of China 100 
years ago suggests that investors needed protection against expropriation just as much 
as foreigners needed it.  Chinese capital markets today are developing rapidly as 
Chinese financial regulators are modernizing the legal framework for investment. One 
approach that might prevent the unequal treatment of foreign and domestic interests is 
to concentrate efforts to protect minority shareholder rights for domestic shares, and 
to test the institutional structures for such things as contests for corporate control, 
public accounting and disclosure and insider trading laws in the context of the 
domestic share market.  Once securities regulators have experimented with these 
issues, it might then be the time to eliminate the difference between domestic and 
international shares. 
 There are also important lessons for the international investment community 
interested in supporting China’s capital market development.  Although much of the 
early political abuses of the international financial system have been corrected with 
the development of international lending institutions like the World Bank, there is still 
the potential, in these dynamic times, for asymmetric competition between domestic 
and international financing.  While it may be tempting to suggest that the most 
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efficient, low cost means of financing Chinese economic development is through 
foreign rather than domestic markets, the international community should realize the 
serious problems that arise from domestic stakeholders who are excluded from 
participation in the profits of such financing. Currently, the dual-listing structure of 
the Chinese equity market is an effective means to mobilize and in some sense to 
nurture domestic commitment to Chinese capital markets. The international 
community should do what it can to support future efforts to protect this re-emergence 
of Chinese investing. This may mean accepting a gradual process of experimentation 
with market regulation and share dissemination, as well as a gradual reduction in the 
differences between foreign and domestic shares. 
 It has become fashionable for both the left and the right to criticize the current 
global financial system – either because it distorts risk-taking incentives by 
governments expecting a bail-out, or because it finances projects that environmental 
and political groups find objectionable. These critics should consider the alternative. 
One hundred years ago, China’s first encounter with globalization created political 
conditions that led ultimately to a rejection of the international financial system. As 
the world now approaches the degree of global market integration it enjoyed at the 
end of the last century, the disparity in international capital market development 
creates potential problems similar to those faced in the past.  International financial 
architects should be wary of suggestions that a new equilibrium can be quickly and 
easily achieved without consideration of the human and political consequences. 
 Besides the immediate, practical implications of our interpretations of Chinese 
financial history, we draw one additional lesson from our current study. Chinese 
capital markets ultimately disappeared because of internal rather than external forces. 
A simplistic view of this is that, in China, the Leninist interpretation of capitalistic 
imperialism eventually won out. Although current empirical research shows that legal 
protection of external shareholder rights – particularly in the face of strong 
stakeholder influences – may ultimately be best for economic development, there are 
large gaps in the empirical record. China and Russia both withdrew from the world 
capital markets as a result of Leninist revolutions. Thus, a longer historical view 
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reveals these gaps to be endogenous. The repudiation and elimination of both internal 
and external financial claims may have been due at least as much to the success of 
legal imperialism as to its failure.  That is, the expansion and articulation of property 
rights of external owners that is so important to the success of corporate enterprise 
also sometimes alienates local stakeholders from the productive sector. 
 
 
 39
References 
Adams, Henry C., 1920, “International Supervision Over Foreign 
Investments,” American Economic Review, 10(1) March, 58-67. 
  
Asiaticus, 1937, “The New Era in Chinese Railway Construction,” 
Pacific Affairs, 10(3) September, 276-288. 
 
Atkin, John Michael, 1977, British Overseas Investment: 1918-1931, 
Arno Press, New York. 
 
Bakaert, Geert and Campbell Harvey 1995 "Time-Varying World Market 
Integration," Journal of Finance, 403-444.  
 
Bakaert, Geert and Lundblad, 2000, Chris "Does Financial 
Liberalization Spur Growth," NBER working paper 
 
Beasley, W.G. 1987, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, Clarendon Press 
 
Dreyer, Edward L. 1995, China at War 1901-1949. Addison, Wesley 
Longman, Essex. 
 
Edelstein, Michael, 1982, Overseas Investment in the Age of High 
Imperialism, Methuen and Co. New York. 
  
Feis, Herbert, 1930, Europe, The World’s Banker: 1870-1914, Yale 
Press, New Haven. 
 
Ferguson, Niall, 2001, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern 
World, 1700- 2000, Basic Books, New York. 
 
Feuerwerker, Albert, 1958, China’s Early Industrialization, Harvard 
University Press.   
 
Hou, Chi-ming, 候志明 1965, Foreign Investment and Economic 
development in China 1840-1937, Harvard Press, Cambridge. 
  
Huenemann, Ralph William, 1984, The Dragon and the Iron Horse: the 
Economics of Railroads in China 1867-1937, The Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge. 
 
Jorion, Philippe and William Goetzmann, 1999, “Global Stock Markets 
of the Twentieth Century ” Journal of Finance, 953-80  
 
 40
Kirby, William C., 1995, “China Unincorporated: Company Law and 
Business Enterprise in Twentieth Century China,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 54(1) February, 43-63. 
Kuhlmann, Willhelm, China’s Foreign Debt, self-published, 1983, 
p.73. 
 
LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny, 1997, “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” 
Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150. 
 
LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny, 1999, “Corporate Ownership Around the World,” 
Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517. 
 
LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny, 2000, “Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), p. 1-25. 
 
Lee, En-Han, 李恩涵 1968, “China’s Response to Foreign Investment 
in her Mining Industry (1902-1911),” Journal of Asian Studies, 28(1) 
November, 55-76. 
 
Lee, En-Han, 李恩涵 1977, China’s Quest for Railway Autonomy: 1904-
1911, Singapore University Press. 
 
Lenin, Vladimir Illyich, 1916, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism. 
 
Lewis, Cleona, 1948, The United States and Foreign Investment 
Problems, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 
  
Lowenfeld, Henry, 1909, Investment an Exact Science, The Financial 
Review of Reviews, London. 
 
Ma, Jianzhong,  1879, “On the Use of Loans to Build Railroads,”  in 
Paul Bailey, ed. Strengthen the Country and Enrich the People: the 
Reform Writings of Ma Jiazhong , Curzon Press, Surry, 1998. 
 
Mauro, Paolo, Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, 2000, “Emerging 
Market spreads: Then Vs. Now,” Working Paper International Monetary 
Fund and Hebrew University. 
 
 41
Mosley, Layna, 2000,  “History Repeating Itself? Sovereign Borrowing 
Before the First World War,” Working Paper, Department of 
Government, University of Notre Dame. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M. Taylor, 2001, “Globalization and 
Capital Markets” NBER Working Paper. 
 
Pan, Junxiang 潘君祥 and Ma, Chuande 马传德, 1998, Currencies in Old 
Shanghai, Shanghai People’s Fine Arts Publishing House, Shanghai 
 
Qian, Jiaju, 千家驹 1955 Archives on Chinese Public Debts, Finance 
and Economics Publishing House, Beijing 
 
Rajan, Raghu and Luigi Zingales, 2001, “The Great Reversals: the 
Politics of Financial Development in the 20
th
 Century,” NBER Working 
Paper 8178. 
 
Riskin, Carl, 1975, “Surplus and Stagnation in Modern China,” in 
China’s Modern Economy in Historical Perspective ed. Dwight H. 
Perkins, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
 
Roll, Richard, 1972. "Interest Rates and Price Expectations during 
the Civil War," Journal of Economic History. 32, 2, 476-498 
 
Rosenblaum, Arthur L., 1975, “Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice 
Riot of 1910,” Journal of Asian Studies, 34(3) May, 689-715. 
  
Scholes, Walter V. and Marie V. Scholes, 1970, The Foreign Policies 
of the Taft Administration,  University of Missouri Press, Columbia. 
 
Shanghai Archive, 上海档案馆 1992, Shanghai’ Stock Exchange Before 
the Liberation, Shanghai Document Publishing House, Shanghai 
 
Stanley, John C., 1970, Late Ch’ing Finance: Hu Kuang-Yung as an 
Innovator, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge. 
       
Stulz, René, 1999, “Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of 
Capital,” Working Paper, Dice Center, The Ohio State University. 
 
Sun, E-Tu Zen, 1951, “The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Loan of 
1908,” The Far Eastern Quarterly 10(2) February, 136-150. 
 
Sun, E-Tu Zen, 1955, “The Pattern of Railway Development in China,” 
The Far Eastern Quarterly, 14(2) February, 179-199. 
 42
  
Sussman, Nathan and Yishay Yasef, 1999, “Institutions, Reforms, and 
country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji 
Period,” Working Paper, Hebrew University. 
 
Suzuki, Toshi, 1994, Japanese Government Loan Issues on the London 
Capital Market 1870-1913, Athlone Press, London. 
  
Tauber, Rudolf, 1911, Die Börsen der Welt, Verlag für Börsen-und 
Finanzliterature A.-G.     
      
Ukhov, Andrey, 2001, “Russian Government Debt Prior to 1918,” 
Draft, International Center for Finance, Yale School of Management. 
 
Wang, Jingyu 汪敬虞, 1999, Financial Activities of Foreign Capital in 
Last Century, People’s Publishing House, Beijing 
 
Willard, Kristen L.  Timothy W. Guinnane, Harvey S. Rosen, 1996, “ 
Turning Points in the Civil War: Views from the Greenback Market,” 
NBER Working Paper No. W5381. 
 
Winston, A. P., 1916, “Chinese Finance Under the Republic,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 30(4) August, 738-779. 
 
Xu, Dixin 许涤新 and Wu Chengming 吴承明, 2000, Chinese Capitalism, 
1522-1840, St. Martins Press, New York 
 
Ye, Shi-chang 叶世昌 and Pan, Lian-gui 潘连贵, 2001， Finance History 
of China Before the Liberation, Fudan University Publishing House, 
Shanghai 
 
Zhu, Yingue, 朱荫贵1994, Government Interference and Modernization of 
China and Japan, Orient Publishing House, Beijing  
 
Zhu, Yingue, 朱荫贵1998, Three Market Crashes and Shanghai Securities 
Market in Late 1800s and Early 1900s, China Economy History Research, 
Issue 3, 58-70 
 
Table 1. Chinese Foreign Debt Issuance 
 
Table 1: List of Chinese External Debt Issues 
 
External Debt of Chinese government as compiled from Kulmann (1977) and Stanley (1970).  Each is coded by date of issue, type of debt and face 
value of issue, converted into U.S. Dollars at exchange rates prevailing at the time.  Loan yields are as specified on the bond at issue, not market 
yields based upon issue price, thus they are typically a lower bound on the actual bond yield.  Currency indicates the currency or form of payment 
promised on the loan.  The purpose of loans is briefly identified, and the type of security or collateral is listed.  Place of issue indicates the location 
the debt was issued.  Multiple locations indicate multiple bond issues. 
Date Type 
US dollar amount 
(millions) if known Yield   Currency Purpose 
Security or collateral if 
known Place of Issue 
1861 loan 200,000  tael war Shanghai custom voucher  
1862 loan 336,587 11 tael war   
1862 loan 169,370  tael    
1864 loan 100,000 6.5 tael armory   
1865 loan     none none  
1866 loan    Tael none   
1866 loan 1,333,000  tael  Maritime-customs/provincial 
revenues 
 
1867 loan 800,000  tael war   
1868 loan 1,413,000 7.25 tael war   
1874 loan 3,260,000 8 sterling war  Hong Kong 
1877 bond 3,333,000 8 tael war maritime customs Hong Kong London 
1878 loan 2,333,300 10 tael war   
1878 bond 1,667,000 5.5 tael none  Berlin 
1879 bond   7 tael none  Hong Kong 
1881 loan 2,667,700 8 tael war   
1883 loan 667,700  tael war   
1883 loan 667,700  tael war   
1884 loan 667,000 8 tael war   
1884 loan 667,000 8 tael war   
1884 loan    sterling armory   
1885 loan 2,667,700  tael war   
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1885 bond 6,543,000 7 sterling war maritime customs Hong Kong London 
1885 loan 6,522,000 6 sterling rail maritime customs London 
1885 bond 3,409,000 6 sterling none maritime customs Hong Kong London 
1886 loan 2,000,000  tael war   
1886 bond 76,000 7 tael none  Shanghai 
1887 loan   5.5 DM none Chihli customs Frankfort Berlin 
1888 loan   7 tael yellow river   
1893 loan    tael none   
1894 bond 726,000 7 tael war maritime customs Shanghai Hong Kong Amsterdam 
Hamburg 
1895 bond 4,347,000 6 sterling indemnity maritime customs London 
1895 bond 13,043,470 6 sterling indemnity maritime customs London 
1895 bond 4,347,000 6 sterling indemnity maritime customs Frankfort Berlin Hamburg 
1895 bond 4,347,000 6 sterling indemnity maritime customs London 
1895 bond 68,782,000 4 gold none maritime customs Paris St. Petersburg Geneva Brussels 
Amsterdam Frankfort 
1896 bond 69,565,000 5 gold indemnity maritime customs London Berlin 
1896 bond 3,333,000 6 tael rail Chinese Eastern Railway Shanghai London 
1897 bond 19,565,217 4 sterling rail Lung-Tsing-U-Hai Railway 
and land 
Brussels 
1898 bond 8,000,000 5 franc rail Cheng-Tai Railway Paris 
1898 bond 69,565,000 4.5 gold indemnity maritime customs, salt Likin 
revenues, customs bonds 
London Berlin 
1899 bond 10,000,000 5 sterling rail Chinese Northern Railway London 
1899 bond 22,500,000 5 franc rail Peking-Hankow rail revenues Paris Geneva Brussels Amsterdam 
1900 bond 3,000,000 5 dollar rail  New York 
1900 bond 1,121,739 5 sterling cable government guarantee London 
1901 loan   5 sterling cable   
1901 bond 300,000,000 4 sterling indemnity maritime custom  Shanghai 
1903 bond 8,000,000 5 franc rail railway and direct obligation 
of government 
Paris 
1904 loan 14,772,700 5 sterling rail existing and future railway London 
1904 certifica
tes 
20,454,500  sterling rail   
1904 bond    sterling rail   
1904 bond    dollar war   
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1905 bond    yen war   
1905 loan 4,444,000 5 sterling indemnity maritime customs and 
provincial revenues 
London Berlin 
 
1905  4,888,800  sterling rail Opium revenues and internal 
revenue bonds 
London 
1905 loan 8,200,000 5 franc rail Railway  
1905 loan   5 sterling rail existing railway and its 
revenue 
London 
1906 bond    dollar war   
1906 loan   4 sterling rail   
1907 loan 400,000  yen rail   
1907 bond 6,521,700 5 sterling rail railway London 
1907  4,782,600 4.5 sterling rail Canton-Hankow railway and 
its revenues 
 
1908 bond 6,521,000 5 sterling rail Direct obligation of 
government, railway 
 
1908  1,075,000 5 yen rail Kirin-Changchun-railway Tokyo 
1908 bond 23,585,000 5 sterling rail railway London Berlin 
1909 cert.    chinese gold 
dollar 
war   
1909 loan 22,727,270 5(4.5) sterling rail   
1909 loan   5(7) sterling repay debts provincial likin revenues, 
direct obligation of 
government 
 
1909 loan 160,000 5 yen rail Hsin-Feng Railway Tokyo 
1910 loan   7 tael local guarantee of the central 
government 
 
1910 loan   7 tael local Kiangnan salt revenues  
1910 loan 12,766,000 5 sterling rail railway and provincial revenue London Berlin 
1910 loan 2,888,510 5 sterling rail   
1911 loan 5,000,000 5 yen none Peking-Hankow railway 
revenue 
 
1911 loan 5,000,000 5 yen rail railway and revenue of 
Kiangsu Province 
 
1911 loan   7 tael local 3rd charge on the ichang salt 
revenues 
Shanghai London Paris Berlin New York 
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1911 loan   7 tael local 1st charge on likin revenues of 
Kwang-Tung 
 
 
1911 loan 2,885,000 5 sterling armory salt taxes, direct obligation of 
government 
 
1911 loan 39,216,000 5 sterling rail revenue on general revenue 
form Hunan and Hupeh prov.  
 
1912 loan 1,500,000 8 yen rail revenues and stock of Kiangsi 
railway 
Tokyo 
1912 loan 1,000,000 8 yen    
1912 loan 10,714,000  sterling repay debts   
1912 loan 1,607,100 6 sterling rail   
1912 loan   7 M local silk likin revenues  
1912 bond   8 M local central government guarantee  
1912 bond   8 tael Treasury taxes of agricultural products 
and supplementary customs 
revenues 
 
1912 bond   6 tael Treasury  Shanghai 
1912 loan 35,087,700 5 sterling repay debts surplus of salt gabelle and 
other government sources 
London 
1912 loan   5 M armory government guarantee  
1913 loan 15,686,000 5 sterling rail Lung-Tsing-U-Hai Railway Paris Brussels 
1913 loan 1,765,000 5 sterling none tax on transfer of property and 
title deeds 
Brussels 
1913 loan 17,655,000 5(6) sterling rail   
1913 loan 19,608,000 5.5 sterling rail   
1913 loan 3,019,600 6 sterling rail   
1913 loan 98,039,200 5 sterling repay debts  London Paris St. Petersburg Brussels 
Tokyo 
1913 loan 4,706,000 6 sterling repay debts  London 
1913 loan 7,843,100 6 sterling none  London 
1914 loan 1,960,784 6 sterling none   
1914 loan 28,864,000 5 franc government 
expenses/rail
way 
industrial enterprises it was 
issued for,municipal taxes 
Paris 
1914 loan 41,667,000 5 sterling rail secured upon a second 
mortgage on the Chiaokia-
London 
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Tayuan-fu railway 
1914 loan 1,562,000 6 sterling repay debts surplus profits of the Peking-
Mukden railway 
Shanghai London 
1914 loan 19,230 5 franc rail   
1914 bond   8 m Treasury   
1914 bond 3,745,455 5 sterling rail   
1915 loan 2,488,000 6 yen  none mining concessions in Hunan 
and Anhwei 
 
1915 bond 2,488,000  yen rail 1st charge on railway  
1915 bond    yen  war   
1915 loan   7(8,10) franc repay debts   
1916 bond 1,150,000 8 dollar rail   
1916 bond 5,500,000 8 dollar Treasury   
1916 loan   8 tael    
1916 loan 5,871,400 8 sterling repay debts   
1916 loan 301,600  yen local  Tokyo 
1916 loan 1,010,000  yen industry  Tokyo 
1916 loan 301,600  yen industry  Tokyo 
1917 loan 505,000  yen industry  Tokyo 
1917 bond 1,010,000 6.5 yen local  Tokyo 
1917 certifica
tes(?) 
2,564,000 7.5 yen repay debts bank shares and treasury bonds Tokyo 
1917 loan 667,000  yen local/industry factory and local government 
guarantee 
Tokyo 
1917 loan 769,000  yen local provincial salt taxes  
1917 loan 1,179,000  yen rail   
1917 loan   7  repay debts Bank of Bhina notes Tokyo 
1917 bond 2,122,640 7 franc Treasury   
1917 bond 52,173  taels    
1917 loan 272,700 6 sterling none peking octroi  
1917 loan 1,090,900 6 sterling none peking octroi  
1917 loan   7 yen repay debts surplus salt revenues  
1917 loan 769,230  yen local   
1917 loan 10,256,000 7.5 yen none Treasury bonds  
1917  3,333,000 6(5) yen rail properties of railway and 
government guarantee 
 
 48
1917 loan 41,025  yen local/industry   
1917 loan 128,200  yen local   
1917 loan 25,600  yen local/industry   
1917 loan 25,600  yen industry   
1918 loan 66,200 9 sterling education   
1918 loan   10 taels none   
1918 loan 1,052,000 8 yen purchase   
1918 bond 755,500 8 sterling telecommunic
ation 
none  
1918 loan 2,667,600 8 sterling army 
equipment 
direct obligation of the 
government 
London 
1918 loan 444,400 8 sterling telecommunic
ation 
government treasury  
1918 loan 526,000  yen military Kailan mining Adm.  Tokyo 
1918 loan 5,261,000 7 yen repay debts surplus salt revenues Tokyo 
1918 loan 1,052,000 7 yen local rights to cooperate in local 
iron-mining 
Tokyo 
1918 loan 526,000  yen government surplus salt revenues Tokyo 
1918 loan 526,000  yen local sundry taxes of Fukien Tokyo 
1918 loan 526,000  yen industry  Tokyo 
1918 loan 7,368,000 7 yen government   Tokyo 
1918 loan 1,052,000 7 yen rail revenues of the railway Tokyo 
1918 loan 52,600  yen rail  Tokyo 
1918 loan 1,578,900  yen telecommunic
ation 
 Tokyo 
1918 loan 10,521,000 7.5-9 yen telecommunic
ation 
all telegraph properties not 
previous pledged 
Tokyo 
1918 loan 526,000  yen local  Tokyo 
1918 loan 10,521,000 5 yen rail  Tokyo 
1918 loan 1,578,900  yen rail collieries in Fengtien owned 
by prov. Gov.  
 
1918 loan 1,578,900  yen industry   
1918 loan 5,261,000  yen repay debts   
1918 loan 2,382,200 8 sterling telecommunic
ation 
exclusive rights to 
communicate with systems 
outside china 
 
 49
1918 loan 5,261,000 7.5 yen rail   
1918 loan 15,789,000 7.5 yen local Kirin and Heilongkiang gold 
mines and government forests 
 
1918 loan 10,521,000 8 yen rail treasury bonds  
1918 loan 10,521,000 8 yen rail   
1918 loan 5,261,000 7 yen    
1918 loan 5,261,000 7 yen    
1918 bond   8 chinese 
dollar 
industry   
1918 loan 1,206,000 10 yen    
1918 loan 1,538,000 7 yen rail Peking-Suiyuan railway  
1918 loan 5,128,300 8 yen telecommunic
ation 
present and future gov. tel. 
Adm. Rev. 
 
1919 loan 901,000 6 sterling  title deeds taxes  
1919 loan 258,500  yen none   
1919 loan 891,900 8 sterling none   
1919 loan 572,000 10 taels none   
1919 loan 752,000 9 franc none   
1919 loan 76,000 9 franc none   
1919 loan 8,122,000 8 sterling transportation  London 
1919 bond 796,300 5 franc Treasury   
1919 loan 448,000 10.8 taels none   
1919 loan 27,700 9 franc none   
1919 bond 3,703,000 7 franc Treasury   
1919 bond 25,000,000 6 dollar Treasury wine and tobacco revenues New York 
1919 loan 5,727,000 7.5 sterling rail earnings from Taokow-
Tchingwha railway 
 
1919 bond 5,500,000 5.5 dollar Treasury wine and tobacco revenues New York Chicago 
1920 loan   12 chinese 
dollar 
repay debts   
1920 bond 2,593,000 5 franc none   
1920 bond 1,075,500 9 franc none   
1920 loan 36,590 9 sterling education   
1920 loan 104,070 8 franc local   
1920 loan 410,000 10.2 yen none   
 loan 15,384  yen none   
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1920 loan 70,000  dollar education   
1920 loan 60,000 6 dollar education   
1920 loan   8 belgian franc haikow 
harbor 
LTUH railway line Brussels 
1920 loan 545,400 5 sterling rail   
1920 loan 3,076,000 9 yen telecommunic
ation 
telegraph installations, 
equipment, properties and 
revenues 
Tokyo 
1920 loan   8 fl rail  Amsterdam 
1920 loan 1,328,000 9 yen none   
1921 loan   12 taels Treasury   
1921 bond 701,000 8 yen Treasury   
1921 loan 1,718,800  yen none   
1921 loan   10 sterling none   
1921 loan 45,100 10 franc education   
1921 loan   8 belgian franc rail  Brussels 
1921 loan 25,000 14 yen education  Tokyo 
1921 loan 28,850 10 yen education  Tokyo 
1921 loan 938,983 8 dollar none   
1921 loan 240,000  yen rail   
1921 loan 1,442,000  yen rail   
1922 bond 14,234,000 8 yen repay debts salt-surplus revenues  
1922 loan 541,000 15 yen forestry&mini
ng 
  
1922 loan 3,720,000 8 sterling rail projected railway from Paotow 
to Ningshia and from Peking 
to Paotow 
London 
1922 bond 6,831,000 6 yen Treasury customs and salt revenues after 
all prior claims 
 
1923 loan 7,121,000 8 belgium 
francs 
rail LTUH railway line Brussels 
1923 loan 6,870,000 8 fl rail LTUH railway line Amsterdam 
1923 bond 19,417,000 6 yen Treasury railway and government 
guarantee 
 
1923 loan   8 taels rail railway  
1925 bond 43,893,900 5 dollar indemnity maritime customers revenues Shanghai London Paris New York 
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and native Chinese custom 
revenues 
 
1925 loan 4,340,000 8 franc rail LTUH railway line Paris New York 
1925 loan 21,600 8 sterling rail China's shared profits in 
Shanghai-Nanking railway 
 
1925 loan 33,010,000 8 sterling reorganize 
bonds 
taxes on transfer of property 
and title deeds and Peking 
octroi 
 
1928 bond 5,000,000 6 Gold indemnity maritime customs revenues Brussels 
1928 bond   8 fl rail   
1929 bond 757,300 8 sterling Rail rolling stock purchased  
1930 bond 20,000,000 2 dollar repay debts   
1933 loan 17,105,386 5 dollar purchase   
1933 bond 100,000,000 5.5 dollar treasury   
1933 bond 4,400,000 9.6 dollar indemnity maritime customs  
1933 Loan 5,000,000 6 Sterling    
1934 Loan 4,000,000 6 taels Rail   
1934 bond 7,352,000 6 sterling Rail secured on a portion of the 
original boxer indemnity 
London 
1934 Loan 5,333,000 5.5 taels Rail   
1935 Loan 1,172,000 6 sterling Bridge   
1935 bond 5,294,000  yen Rail  Tokyo 
1936 loan 750,000  sterling industry   
1936 loan 5,500,000 6 sterling Rail direct obligation of the 
government and also secured 
on railway/bridge revenues 
Shanghai 
1936  2,000,000 6 dollar   Canton Customs  
1936  13,500,000 6 sterling   
Canton local tax and railway 
income 
 
1937 loan     Rail   
1937 bond 4,900,000 4 dollar reorganize 
bonds 
direct charge on entire salt 
revenues 
 
1937 loan 15,000,000 5 sterling Rail surplus salt revenues not yet 
pledged 
 
1937 loan 18,500,000 5 sterling Rail rail  
1937 loan 4,000,000 6 sterling Rail   
 52
1937 loan   6 cgu Rail   
1937 loan 1,920,000 6 sterling Rail   
1937 Loan 50,000,000 6 Dollar  Salt tax  
1937 Loan 50,000,000 6 sterling  Salt tax  
1938 Loan   7 Francs Rail Kwangtung mining taxes  
1939 Loan 40,000,000 5 sterling  National income  
1939 Loan 45,980,000 5 Dollar  National income  
1940 Loan 10,000,000 5 Dollar  Highway income  
1941 loan 99,800,000 4 Dollar     
1945 Loan 400,000,000 4 Dollar    
1946 Loan 300,000,000 20 dollar    
1982 Loan 40,816,000 8.7 yen None  Tokyo 
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Table 2. Chinese Domestic Debt Issuance  
 
 
Year 
Amount Converted 
in US Dollar Yield Converted Yield Securities Currency 
      
1894 8,476,900  8.4 6.46 Rent Tax Taels 
1898 7,692,300  6 4.62  Taels 
1910 7,407,400  7.2 5.33  Yuan 
1911 1,146,800  6 4.20 Department Income Yuan 
1912 4,848,600  8 5.26 National income Yuan 
1912 89,407,800  6 3.95 National Transactional tax Yuan 
1913 16,077,400  6 3.87 Railway income Yuan 
1914 15,194,100  6 3.53 Unsecured custom Yuan 
1914 1,647,000  6 3.53 Bond Fund Yuan 
1915 11,428,500  6 3.43 Tobacco Tax Yuan 
1917 43,636,300  6 5.45 Special Fund Yuan 
1918 52,941,100  7 8.24 Commodity Tax Yuan 
1919 80,000,000  6 8.00 Unsecured custom Yuan 
1919 2,880,000  7 9.33 Commodity Tax Yuan 
1920 13,064,500  6 6.45 Tobacco Tax and special fund Yuan 
1920 1,301,100  7 7.53 Tobacco Tax and special fund Yuan 
1920 58,483,800  6 6.45 Special Fund Yuan 
1920 14,623,600  7 7.53 Special Fund Yuan 
1921 40,278,500  8 5.71 Salt Tax Yuan 
1921 10,000,000  18 12.86  Yuan 
1921 7,142,800  7 5.00 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
1922 3,731,300  8 5.97 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
1923 746,300  8 5.97 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
1923 3,134,300  8 5.97 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
1924 11,111,000  8 5.93 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
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1924 5,882,300  8 5.88 Railway income Yuan 
1925 6,060,600  8 6.06 Special Fund Yuan 
1925 2,255,600  8 6.02 Special Fund Yuan 
1925 1,515,200  8 6.06 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
1925 1,818,200  8 6.06 Stopped indemnity Yuan 
1925 12,878,700    National Income Yuan 
1926   4 2.72 Hupei Export Tax Yuan 
1926 4,033,100 8 5.30 Hupei Export Tax Yuan 
1926 8,867,550 6 3.97 National Income Yuan 
1926 19,736,800 7 4.61 River custom Yuan 
1926 26,315,800 9.6 6.32 River custom Yuan 
1927 10,126,600 8 5.06 Tobacco Tax Yuan 
1927 6,250,000 8 5.00 Yin Hua Tax Yuan 
1927   8 5.00 Gasoline Tax Yuan 
1927 5,660,400 9.6 6.04 Tianjin Custom Tax Yuan 
1927   8 5.00 
National Income and transportation 
income Yuan 
1927 18,750,000 8 5.00 Stopped Indemnity Yuan 
1927 28,481,000 2.5 1.58 Remaining customs Yuan 
1928 6,666,700 8 5.33 Custom Increment Yuan 
1928 31,847,100 8 5.10 Custom Increment Yuan 
1928 15,894,000 9.6 6.36 Tobacco Tax Yuan 
1928 2,649,000 9.6 6.36 Tianjin Custom Tax Yuan 
1928 26,143,800 8.4 5.49 Custom Increment Yuan 
1928 45,751,600 8.4 5.49 Custom Increment Yuan 
1929 12,500,000 2 1.25 Railway income Yuan 
1929 937,500 6 3.75 Eletronic Plant Income Yuan 
1929 1,373,600 8 4.40 Eletronic Plant Income Yuan 
1929 11,111,100 8 4.44 Custom Increment Yuan 
1929 5,681,800 8 4.55 Telecomm. Income Yuan 
1929 13,714,300 8 4.57 Tobacco Tax Yuan 
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1929 45,454,500 8 4.55 Custom Increment Yuan 
1929 28,409,100 9.6 5.45 Custom Increment Yuan 
1930 23,904,400 8.4 3.35 Tobacco Tax Yuan 
1930 3,174,600 8 3.17 Export Income Yuan 
1930 31,746,000 9.6 3.81 Custom Increment Yuan 
1930 31,746,000 9.6 3.81 Tobacco and flour tax Yuan 
1930 31,746,000 9.6 3.81 Salt Tax Yuan 
1930 31,746,000 9.6 3.81 National tax Yuan 
1930 31,746,000 8 3.17 Stopped Indemnity Yuan 
1932 6,006,000 6 1.80 Tobacco tax and special fund Yuan 
1932 1,801,800 6 1.80 Eletronic Plant Income Yuan 
1932 1,201,200 6 1.80 Salt Tax and Special fund Yuan 
1932 30,030,000 6 1.80 Custom Increment Yuan 
1933 25,000,000 6 1.50 Custom Increment Yuan 
1933 3,000,000 6 1.50 Railway income Yuan 
1933 3,000,000 6 1.50 Salt Tax Yuan 
1934 34,482,800 6 2.07  Yuan 
1934 41,379,300 7.2 2.48 Stopped Indemnity Yuan 
1934 41,379,300 7.2 2.48 Stopped Indemnity Yuan 
1934 34,482,800 6 2.07 Custom Increment Yuan 
1934 241,379,300 6 2.07 Salt Tax Yuan 
1934 10,344,800 6 2.07 Szechuan local tax Yuan 
1934 3,448,300 6 2.07 Telecomm. Income Yuan 
1934 6,896,500 6 2.07 Custom Increment Yuan 
1935 561,538,500 6 2.31  Yuan 
1935 130,769,200 6 2.31 Stopped Indemnity and Special Bond Yuan 
1935 10,384,600 6 2.31 Railway income Yuan 
1935 30,769,200 6 2.31 Railway income Yuan 
1935 5,769,200 6 2.31 Szechuan local tax Yuan 
1935 46,153,800 4 1.54 Canton local tax Yuan 
1936 5,384,600 6 2.31 Railway income  
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1936 189,230,800 4 1.54 National Income Yuan 
1936 6,538,500 4 1.54 Guang'xi Salt Tax Yuan 
1937 148,656,700 6 1.79 Income tax Yuan 
1937 29,850,700 5 1.49 Salt tax Yuan 
1937 7,440,500 4 1.19 National Income Yuan 
1938 1,153,846,100 6 1.15 National Income Yuan 
1938 1,153,846,100 6 1.15 General Tax and Tobacco tax Yuan 
1939 126,161,600 6 0.61 National Income Yuan 
1940 77,419,300 6 0.39 National Income Yuan 
1940 77,419,300 6 0.39 National Income Yuan 
1940   5 0.33 Filed rent 
Corn: 6,730,000 Dan; 
Wheat: 590,000 Dan 
1941 5,291,000 6 0.32   
1941 32,222,200 6 0.32 Britain loan  
1942 168,539,300 6 0.34 Special Fund  
1942 9,831,400    National income  
1942 280,898,800 6 0.34 National Income  
1945 204,778 6     
1945       Grain: 10,000,000 Dan 
1946   6 0.00 Foreign Exchange Fund  
1947   15 0.00 National Income  
1947   5 0.00 National Income Jin Yuan Dollar 
1948   5 0.00  Gold: 2,000,000 Liang 
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Figure 1. Seperation of Chinese Domestic and Foreign Stocks in The 1880s. 
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Figure 2. Y
ields of Foreign Public D
ebts of R
ussia, C
hina, Japan and India 
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Figure 2. Yields (Relative to British Gilt) of Foreign Public Debt of Russia, China, Japan and India 
Yields (Relative to British Gilt): Russia, China, Japan, India
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